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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4676 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS, 
   Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
 United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
 (Related to M.D. Pa. Crim. No. 05-cr-00493) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
January 6, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: 1/24/2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se petitioner, Michael Curtis Reynolds, seeks a writ of mandamus compelling 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to conduct a 
“Franks hearing.”1  Finding no basis for granting mandamus relief, we will deny the 
petition. 
On July 12, 2007, Reynolds was found guilty by a jury of five counts of a six-
                                                 
1
 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
 
2 
 
count superseding indictment.  He was subsequently sentenced to 360 months 
imprisonment and three years supervised release, and was ordered to pay a $500.00 
special assessment.  We affirmed the Judgment and Commitment in a non-precedential 
opinion issued on March 18, 2010,
2
  and the Supreme Court denied Reynolds’ petition for 
writ of certiorari on October 4, 2010.  Despite the unfavorable outcome of his direct 
appeal and cert. petition, Reynolds apparently believes that he is nonetheless entitled to a 
hearing regarding the affidavit of probable cause used to support the search warrant 
issued in the underlying criminal action.  According to Reynolds, the District Court is 
obligated to conduct a Franks hearing as a result of this Court’s March 18th opinion and 
in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 Mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary cases, see In re Diet 
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005), as the petitioner must 
demonstrate that he has “no other adequate means” to obtain the desired relief and a 
“clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ.  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 
(3d Cir. 1996).  We do not hesitate to conclude that Reynolds has failed to demonstrate a 
clear and indisputable right to the issuance of a mandamus petition ordering the District 
Court to hold a Franks hearing. 
Contrary to Reynolds’ assertion, there is nothing in our opinion affirming the 
Judgment and Commitment which lends support to his contention.  Though we stated that 
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  We subsequently denied Reynolds’ motion to recall the mandate in an order 
issued on September 14, 2010.   
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the factual question as to whether a misstatement of fact set forth in an affidavit for 
probable cause was intentionally or recklessly made is one to be determined by the 
District Court in the first instance, we also noted that “Reynolds did not assert the 
existence of a specific misstatement of fact in the District Court.  Thus, there [was] no 
factual determination by the District Court to review.”  United States v. Reynolds, 374 F. 
App’x. 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2010).  We further held that Reynolds’ assertion that the master 
affidavit did not establish probable cause was unpersuasive.  Id. 
Reynolds’ reliance on Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) fares no better.  While we do not 
intend to comment on the timeliness of his filing, we note that the District Court docket 
reflects that Reynolds only recently filed a “Motion Under Rule 33 for New Trial or 
Motion Under Rule 52(b), Plain Error” on December 22, 2010.  Although an appellate 
court may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that undue delay is tantamount to a 
failure to exercise jurisdiction, Madden, 102 F.3d at 79, the manner in which a court 
controls its docket is discretionary.  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 
(3d Cir. 1982).  There certainly has been no undue delay on the part of the District Court 
in considering Reynolds’ request for relief under Rules 33 and/or 52(b).  Moreover, 
Reynolds has shown no clear and indisputable right to a mandamus petition compelling 
the District Court to hold a Franks hearing under Rule 52(b), where that court has yet to 
consider his motion seeking such a hearing.  Additionally, any challenge to the District 
Court’s disposition of this post-judgment motion will be available in the form of an 
appeal to this Court once a decision has been issued. 
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We note that Reynolds also appears to take issue with the manner in which his 
“Hazel-Atlas” Motion has been docketed by the District Court.  A review of the District 
Court docket reveals that the motion was filed in the underlying action on November 15, 
2010.  The government’s opposition to the motion was received two weeks later.  The 
motion thus appears ripe for disposition.  Though it is unclear whether Reynolds is 
seeking to compel the District Court to act on this motion as well, we likewise conclude 
that there has been no undue delay on the part of the District Court in disposing of 
petitioner’s motion.  This is especially true considering the fact that Reynolds continues 
to bombard the District Court with pro se filings.  Furthermore, we once again state that 
any challenge Reynolds wishes to raise as to the construction ultimately afforded his 
motion by the District Court can be presented on appeal from any unfavorable decision. 
  For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of mandamus will be denied. 
 
 
